Can Discrimination Law Affect the Imposition of a Minimum Age Requirement for Employment in the National Basketball Association? by Fuhrman, Jeffrey P.
Comments
CAN DISCRIMINATION LAW AFFECT THE
IMPOSITION OF A MNIMUM AGE REQUIREMENT
FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE NATIONAL
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION?
Jeffrey Paul Fuhrmant
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Phenomenon of Early Entry
In the spring of 1999, twenty-seven underclassmen declared
themselves eligible for the National Basketball Association ("NBA")
player draft.1 The list of underclassmen included twelve college freshmen
2and sophomores, as well as one high school senior. A total of 100 players
declared their eligibility between the 1997 and 1999 drafts.3 Considering
that the draft consists of two rounds in which each team in the league is
allotted one selection,4 a striking percentage of draft selections in the late
1990's involved underclassmen. As a result of the developments of recent
years, "early entry" into the NBA is a stark reality in the twenty-first
century.
Even prestigious Duke University has lost players due to early entry.
t B.A. 1998, University of Pennsylvania, School of Arts and Sciences; J.D. Candidate 2001,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. 1999 NBA Draft Underclassmen, at http:llwww.sports.excite.comlnbalnews/unders.
html (last modified June 30, 1999).
2. Jonathan Bender went straight from Mississippi's Picayune High School to the
NBA. Id.
3. Id.
4. There were twenty-nine teams in the NBA and there were fifty-eight selections in
the two round 2000 NBA draft. See http://nbadraft.net/1999.html.
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Prior to 1999, Duke was famous for its ability to retain players with NBA
skills for the duration of the players' collegiate eligibility. 5 In the 1999
draft, Duke lost the following players to the NBA draft: William Avery, a
sophomore; Elton Brand, a sophomore; and Corey Maggette, a freshman.6
When Duke lost its three most talented players to the lure of the NBA that
year, it became clear that no institution, no matter how esteemed its athletic
history, is immune from early entry. In fact, the trend of talented players
leaving college or high school before their eligibility expires is so
pronounced that it is extraordinary when an All-American player continues
to play at the college level through graduation.7 Nowadays, senior year, or
even college itself, is primarily for those who need more time to develop
their NBA skills. Tim Duncan and Keith Van Horn are two current NBA
players who opted to forgo the 1996 draft and remain in school for their
senior year. Both players would have easily been high picks in the 1996
draft.8 However, they both elected to stay in college and both were
eventual lottery picks, having been drafted first and second9 in the 1997
draft.10 The surprise surrounding their respective decisions to stay in
school illuminates what is most alarming about the early entry trend.
Staying in school has now become the exception, rather than the rule.
Young athletes are more likely to leave school as a result of the
astonishing success of Kobe Bryant and Kevin Garnett. These two players
decided to opt out of college in order to play in the NBA, and both have
beaten the odds, becoming legitimate NBA stars. When players such as
Kobe Bryant and Kevin Garnett succeed in becoming NBA superstars, they
have an enormous impact on younger players with similar dreams. A
problem with the lure of NBA super-stardom is that for every Kobe Bryant,
there are many more examples like Taj (Red) McDavid and Scotty
5. Issue of Minimum Age Debated on First Day of NBPA Meeting, at http://www.
sports.excite.com/news/990706.html (last modified July 6, 1999).
6. 1999 NBA Draft Underclassmen, supra note 1.
7. Tim Crothers, Making the Jump: The Odds of Making It in the NBA Are Daunting
for Anyone. So How Does a Young College Star Know When the Time is Right to Step up to
the Pros?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 15, 1996, at 24 (discussing the phenomenon of early
entry in the NBA that began with the institution of the "hardship rule" in 1971 and has
increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s), available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. John Rowe, '97-The Year in Sports, THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Dec. 28,
1997, at S10 (reporting that in the 1997 players draft, Tim Duncan was selected first by San
Antonio and Keith Van Horn was selected second by Philadelphia), available at LEXIS,
News Group File, All.
11. Big East Conference Commissioner Mike Tranghese describes the success of Kobe
Bryant and Kevin Garnett as having an "incredible influence" on kids. Lenn Robbins,
School Daze: Keeping Stars From NBA Bait Is No Easy Task, TiH RECORD, (Bergen
County, NJ), Nov. 17, 1996, at S01, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
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Thurman. Red McDavid was a high school player from Williamston,
South Carolina who declared himself eligible for the 1997 draft; however,
he did not get drafted and has since vanished into obscurity. 2 McDavid
certainly would have benefited from attending college and receiving an
education, while perhaps honing his skills until he reached NBA caliber.
Another example of the dangerous allure of early entry is Scotty Thurman's
decision to enter the NBA draft. Thurman was a University of Arkansas
star who left after his junior year in order to seek a professional NBA
career. 13 Thurman was not drafted and was subsequently released by the
New Jersey Nets after being signed as a free agent.14 He has since been
languishing in the Continental Basketball Association and has become a
classic example of early entry miscalculation.' 5
Early entry lures players for a number of reasons. Many of the players
who enter early are young adults who need money to support their families
and who may not be interested in an education. If jobs are hard to come
by, it would appear illogical to forsake millions of dollars for an education
that will, at best, deliver a fraction of the salary offered by the NBA.'
6
Although the players can ultimately hurt themselves with early entry, there
is an undeniably clear incentive that motivates this trend.
However, early entry has severe costs, not only for the players who do
not succeed in the NBA, but also for the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA"). With early entry, the NCAA loses out on the
wealth of talent a star player can bring to a school. For universities with
top basketball programs, star players can carry teams far into the final
stages of the NCAA tournament. For the university, this will result in an
immeasurable promotion in reputation, which can affect everything from
licensing deals to higher student matriculation. As a result of early entry,
college teams "no longer stay together long enough to gel and capture the
imagination of fans.' In reality, the harm to the NCAA caused by early
entry may only affect its wallet. Despite this harm, any NCAA coach
would undoubtedly still want a Bryant or Garnett in his program, even if it
12. Alexander Wolff, Impossible Dream: A Record 47 Early Entrants Applied for the
NBA Draft, Many Harboring Quixotic Visions of Starring on Basketball's Brightest Stage,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 2, 1997, at 80.
13. Crothers, supra note 7, at 26.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Nolan Richardson, Arkansas head coach points out how early entry may be an
obvious decision: "The pros may be a kid's only meal ticket. I've done some research, and I
found that one million people got their college degrees last year and there were only
500,000 jobs out there. I don't know of any job better than the NBA." Id.
17. Jack McCallum, Going, Going, Gone: The Growing Exodus of Underclassmen to
the NBA Is Ripping the Heart Out of the College Game, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 20,
1996, at 52.
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was only for one year.18 Nonetheless, if the NBA was altogether enjoying
the early entry phenomenon, then there would not be an issue regarding
early entry.
The NBA also suffers from early entry, suggesting that it too might be
interested in a minimum age requirement. First, the NBA prefers to have
players attend or stay in college because it gives the players more time to
develop their skills at no cost to the league.19 Second, early entry forces the
NBA to invest in something analogous to child care, holding players' hands
as they enter the league to ensure that they do not implode from the sudden
and dramatic change of lifestyle.20  The NBA can be a rigorous
environment, and while some players can handle the adjustment to the
NBA lifestyle, many cannot. Furthermore, older veterans, who came to the
league in a different era, may not want to nurture rookies. Third, some
believe that the quality of play in the NBA has suffered because players are
now coming into the league unprepared for basketball at such a high
level.2 ' In addition, by foregoing college or even high school, these players
may not be equipped with the adequate skills necessary to cope with life
after the NBA, especially if they do not reach superstar status while playing
professionally. Although the NBA does have a program to help rookies, it
22may not be enough. In the fall of 1999, the NBA suffered a public
relations nightmare when Leon Smith, a straight-from-high-school draftee
and twenty-first pick in the first round, made headlines for throwing a
temper tantrum at the first Dallas Mavericks practice. As a result of all
these factors, there has been a movement within the NBA to aggressively
attack this dilemma.24
18. Robbins, supra note 11, at SO1 (suggesting that college basketball coaches want the
best players and heavily recruit even those who they know may only stay for one year).
19. Joe Gilmartin, Early Entry Isn't Crisis NCAA, NBA Say It Is, PHOENIX GAZETrE,
May 21, 1996, at D1 (suggesting that the NBA's real concern regarding early entry is not
the welfare of athletes, but rather its preference for athletes who gain more basketball
experience in college).
20. Bob Herzog, Sunday Special! Caught in the Draft Stay in School? Not when
Dollars Rule. Wisdom of Isiah, NEWSDAY (New York), June 27, 1999, at C20 (discussing
the NBA's transition program, which helps rookies make the social transition from college
or high school to the NBA).
21. The Commish's Wish, Stern Wants Limit to Deter Underclassmen, at http://www.
cnnsi.com/basketball/nba/1999/draft/news.html (last modified June 24, 1999).
22. Even Isiah Thomas, one of the fifty greatest NBA players of all time who left
college early in order to play in the NBA, but later returned to earn his degree, has spoken
frequently of the need to ensure adequate education for early entry players. See Robbins,
supra note 11, at SO1.
23. Sonja Steptoe, Minimum Age, What Can the NBA Do About Early Entry, if
Anything?, at http:llwww.cnnsi.comlbasketballlnbalnews/1999.html (last modified July 15,
1999).
24. This comment will not discuss the efforts made by the NCAA to address this issue,
but instead will focus on the NBA's efforts with respect to early entry. In addition, this
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B. The Minimum Age Requirement
In the summer of 1999, NBA Commissioner David Stem urged the
players union to consider a minimum age requirement that would prohibit
qualified athletes under a certain age from playing in the NBA.2' The
purpose of this threshold would be to eradicate, or at least lessen, the
association between the NBA and early entry athletes.26 Commissioner
Stem recommended that the NBA adopt a threshold age of twenty for draft
eligibility.27 Even though this limit would not absolutely prohibit players
from leaving school early, since most students turn twenty in their
sophomore or junior year, it would ensure that a prospective NBA player
has received some college experience and sharpened his skills. If adopted,
the proposed rule would resemble the National Football League's ("NFL")
age requirement that prohibits players from becoming eligible until they
have completed their junior year in college.2s In effect, this rule turns
college football into a minor league for players to develop their skills.29
While both Stem and Deputy Commissioner Russell Granik have promoted
an age threshold, the league needs approval from the players union to
implement this rule. To date, there has been little acceptance of the
threshold. During the summer of 1999, Brent Barry, a member of the six-
person player's committee appointed to discuss the issue, stated that the
players union would not endorse a minimum age requirement.0 Without
the acceptance of the players union, such a rule cannot legally be imposed
in the NBA because of antitrust implications.3'
C. The Issue: The Legal Implications of a Minimum Age Requirement
In 1971, Haywood v. National Basketball Assn 3 2 invalidated the
former NBA minimum age requirement as a violation of section 1 of the
comment will discuss only the potential legal implications of a minimum age requirement
on the NBA.
25. The Commish's Wish, Stem Wants Limit to Deter Underclassmen, supra note 21.
26. David Stem commented that he did not want the draft system to be an incentive for
players to leave school early. Id.
27. Id.
28. Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. McKinnon, Backtalk: Young Athletes Are
Being Unlawfiully Locked Out of the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997, at SP15.
29. Id.
30. Age-old Question, Players Union Vehemently Opposed to Age Limit, formerly
posted at http://www.cnnsi.com/basketballlnba/news/1999.html (last modified July 9, 1999)
(on file with author).
31. Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1204-06 (1971) (holding that a
minimum age requirement in the NBA constituted a group boycott and, therefore, violated
section I of the Sherman Act).
32. 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
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Sherman Act.33 The Court held that in the absence of an antitrust
exemption for basketball, a unilateral minimum age requirement, when
enforced by the league, would constitute a group boycott and therefore
would violate the Sherman Act.34  Historically, basketball warrants a
different antitrust scrutiny than does baseball, a sport that once enjoyed a
blanket antitrust exemption.35 In order to avoid antitrust scrutiny, in the
absence of a specific antitrust exemption, a collective bargaining agreement
("CBA") must contain a provision specifically permitting what would
otherwise constitute illegal antitrust activity.36 This type of provision
qualifies for the non-statutory labor exemption ("NSLE"). 37 Therefore, in
order for the NBA to successfully introduce a minimum age requirement,
and avoid antitrust scrutiny, this kind of provision must be a part of a CBA.
While it is clear that a minimum age requirement within a CBA is
protected from antitrust scrutiny, there has been very little discussion of
other possible legal implications. The purpose of this comment is to
consider whether employment discrimination law will affect the legal status
of a minimum age requirement. In other words, even if a minimum age
requirement withstands antitrust scrutiny, the question is whether such a
requirement will be invalidated under employment discrimination law. A
minimum age requirement implicates specific federal and state age
discrimination laws.3s Under federal law, the relevant statute is the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").39 This law affords age
discrimination relief only to persons over age forty.
40
The goal of this comment is to illustrate the potential vulnerability of
the legality of a minimum age requirement in the NBA. While it currently
appears that age discrimination does not offer a real remedy for NBA
players, reverse age discrimination claims have the potential to protect
33. Id. at 1206.
34. Id. at 1205.
35. Fed. Baseball Club of Bait. v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (upholding a
complete antitrust exemption for professional baseball); see also Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees,
346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (upholding the same exemption). These exemptions were
subsequently limited by the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 27a (2000).
36. See McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979) (declaring
that when the provision is embedded in a CBA, antitrust liability does not attach).
37. Id.
38. There are many federal and state provisions that prohibit age discrimination. When
there is a regulation based upon age, it is necessary to look at the relevant provisions in
order to determine whether the regulation violates governing law. The primary provision in
federal law is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§
621-34 (1994).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 631(a) (stating that "[t]he prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to
individuals who are at least 40 years of age").
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younger players seeking entry into the league.
41
Reverse age discrimination claims, while relatively unsuccessful, are
increasing in number and could eventually change the face of
employer/employee relations.42 In 1999, the New Jersey Supreme Court
permitted a twenty-five year old to bring an age discrimination claim under
43the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. Clearly, if reverse age
discrimination claims were more prevalent, the effects would be felt
beyond the NBA. However, consideration of reverse age discrimination in
conjunction with the NBA illustrates how sports employment law can
involve substantial legal issues that challenge courtrooms on a daily basis.
Despite the special treatment major professional sports receive in
regulating their employees, the NBA, as an employer, is still subject to
United States employment regulations. In the end, perhaps employment
law will be able to erode some of the ironclad protection that the NSLE
affords professional sports. Thus, it is necessary to first analyze sports law
and then employment discrimination law in an effort to ultimately tie them
together. This would then allow an analysis of whether a potential NBA
rookie would be able to bring a reverse age discrimination claim.
II. ANTITRUST AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
A. The Historical Doctrine: The Baseball Exemption
The formation of a professional sports league presents major legal
questions because of the internal measures leagues take in order to enhance
the quality of play. Many of these measures challenge the basic tenets of
pro-competitive United States law. While professional sports leagues
appear to encourage competitive achievements, they are, in fact, ripe with
restrictive measures which limit access to competition. For example, sports
leagues restrict the number of teams in their league, the cities that may field
teams, the amount of players who can compete, and most controversial, the
compensation players receive for their services.
41. In recent years litigation of reverse age discrimination claims has increased.
Despite the lack of a clear indication that a claim exists under the law, a significant number
of plaintiffs have brought reverse age discrimination claims. See, e.g., Edwards v. Bd. of
Regents, 2 F.3d 382, 382 (11th Cir. 1993) (involving a professor who claimed that a
university gave preferential treatment to an older teacher who was closer to retirement);
Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d. 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992) (alleging that an early
retirement program constituted unlawful reverse age discrimination under the ADEA).
42. If reverse age discrimination claims succeed, then employers will be forced to
reconsider job qualifications and promotion requirements for younger employees.
43. Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 957 (N.J. 1999) (allowing a
reverse age discrimination claim).
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The anti-competitive measures of professional sports leagues
exemplify the very reason that antitrust law exists. Antitrust law is meant
to ensure a level playing field in all business enterprises. However, sports
leagues have survived, and even flourished, due to the protection of
legislative and judicial measures that withhold antitrust scrutiny. Antitrust
exemption allows professional leagues to institute measures, such as the
NFL salary cap, without the threat of paralyzing litigation.
There is a tension between antitrust and labor law, as the aim of
antitrust law is to promote competition and discourage collective behavior,
while the aim of labor law is to utilize collective activity to protect
workers' rights. A series of judicial decisions has interpreted the
legislation to alleviate this tension by providing a clear governing structure
for determining how to protect both labor and competition.
The Sherman Act, specifically sections 1 and 2, is the primary
legislation that prohibits anti-competitive measures. 44 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act declares that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.., is hereby declared
to be illegal. ' 4S Section 2 of the Sherman Act asserts that "[e]very person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce... shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... , 6 Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act have provided the basis for numerous challenges to the
provisions governing professional sports leagues. The result is a long
series of cases that protect certain measures taken by these leagues.
This series begins with several cases that consider the effect of
antitrust law on professional baseball. In 1914, a New York court in
American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase47 suggested that
baseball does not qualify as interstate commerce and, therefore, antitrust
law does not apply.4 Following the logic of Chase, the Supreme Court in
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League49 held that baseball
was neither interstate nor commerce. 0 As in Chase, this ruling had the
effect of exempting baseball from antitrust scrutiny. 1 In 1949, the
holdings of Chase and Federal Baseball were challenged by Gardella v.
Chandler.12 The Second Circuit held that baseball is interstate and could be
44. Sherman Act sections 1,2, 15.U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
45. Id. at § 1.
46. Id. at § 2.
47. 149 N.Y.S. 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914).
48. Id. at 17.
49. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
50. Id. at 209.
51. Id.
52. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
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interpreted to include services.sY While this case was ultimately settled, the
court was the first to allow an antitrust challenge by professional baseball
players against the reserve system instituted by Major League Baseball.
54
In Toolson v. New York Yankees 55 the next major case to consider
professional baseball in an antitrust context, the Supreme Court mentioned
the exemption for baseball.5 6 On the authority of Federal Baseball, the
Court held that Congress did not intend to include baseball within federal
antitrust laws. 7 Finally, in Flood v. Kuhn, 8 the Supreme Court held that
even though baseball is considered interstate commerce, the exemption
carved out was an "established aberration." 9 Here, the Supreme Court
rested on the doctrine of stare decisis to hold that baseball deserves
antitrust protection and thus left it up to Congress to alter the situation? °
The historic protection given to baseball has changed through recent
case law and legislation. In Piazza v. Major League Basebal' the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that baseball does not warrant a blanket
antitrust exemption.62 The court determined that while Federal Baseball,
Toolson, and Flood served to protect the reserve system from antitrust
scrutiny, they did not protect other aspects of baseball.63 Congress closed
the door on baseball's antitrust exemption with the Curt Flood Act of
1998.64 This legislation ended the blanket antitrust exemption for baseball.
Section 27(a) of the Act eliminates baseball's special status by adjusting
the antitrust treatment of baseball to match other major professional
sports.65
B. The Non-statutory Labor Exemption
Although baseball did historically enjoy certain antitrust exemptions,
other major professional sports have not enjoyed such protection. The
antitrust protection that most professional sports leagues receive is derived
from the construction of a doctrine called the non-statutory labor
53. Id. at409-10.
54. A reserve system is a system in professional sports leagues that allows teams to
reserve the right to particular players, thereby restricting the players' ability to seek
employment elsewhere.
55. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
56. Id. at 357.
57. Id.
58. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 276.
61. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D.P.A. 1993).
62. Id. at421.
63. Id.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 27(a) (1998).
65. Id.
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exemption ("NSLE"). The NSLE, which applies to labor-management
bargaining situations, developed after the statutory labor exemption.66 The
statutory labor exemption refers to doctrines such as the Clayton Act and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Collectively, those acts protect labor
organizations from antitrust scrutiny.67
Without an antitrust exemption, professional sports leagues have been
forced to confront antitrust challenges. Mackey v. National Football
League68 is a famous case that demonstrates the level of scrutiny required
for antitrust challenges. In Mackey, the court considered the validity of the
Rozelle rule.69 The rule, imposed by former league commissioner Pete
Rozelle, restricted player movement between teams.70  After a league
strike, the NFL players commenced an antitrust suit against the
implementation of the Rozelle rule, claiming that it constituted a group
boycott.71 In response to this challenge, the court constructed a method of
analysis within the rule of reason scrutiny that classically governed
72antitrust matters. In Mackey, the court held that a league provision fails
rule of reason scrutiny and, therefore, violates antitrust law if it does not
satisfy a three-part test. The test asks: 1) does the assailed practice affect
only the parties to the agreement; 2) is the provision a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining; and 3) is the provision a result of good faith, arms-
length bargaining?73 After applying this test, the Mackey court determined
that the Rozelle rule was a violation of antitrust law.74 Subsequently, this
test was modified by National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States,75 which directed courts to determine whether such provisions have
pro-competitive effects. 76  After Mackey and National Society of
Professional Engineers, the general standard was set for determining
whether a league measure violated antitrust law. This new standard was
tested in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. ,7 where the Court of Appeals for the
66. Connell Constr., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 621-22 (1975) (explaining the development of the non-statutory labor exemption).
67. See Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1999) (allowing labor unions to
escape antitrust scrutiny); Norris-LaGuardia Labor Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1999)
(denying courts the right to issue restraining orders or injunctions in labor dispute cases).
68. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
69. Id. at 609.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Rule of reason analysis is a method for determining whether a provision or an act
constitutes an "unreasonable restraint of trade" in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 618.
73. Id. at 623.
74. Id. at 618.
75. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
76. Id. at 691-92.
77. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
594
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District of Columbia Circuit held that a draft's anti-competitive effects
outweighed its pro-competitive effects, thereby violating antitrust law*
78
Thus, the case law history suggests that players often have flexibility
to pursue causes of action for antitrust violations. With such a precedent, it
appears that a potential NBA rookie seeking entry into the league would
certainly have a cause of action under antitrust law. However, as
mentioned above, courts have constructed a doctrine that protects labor-
management relations in specific situations. Cases such as Mackey 9 and
Smith80 present viable antitrust challenges because the provisions in
question existed outside a CBA. Courts have traditionally protected
provisions that are part of CBAs in an attempt to address the tension
between labor and antitrust law.
Under the NSLE, a union-management agreement that is negotiated in
good faith will receive protection. While this doctrine applies to all labor-
management situations, in terms of sports law, it protects provisions within
CBAs. In McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.,81 the Sixth Circuit upheld a
reserve system in the National Hockey League because it was part of a
CBA negotiated in good faith."2 Since the entire CBA was bargained in
good faith, the court held that even if the particular provision was harsh, it
was deserving of antitrust protection.83
In an even greater leap, the Second Circuit held that the CBA applied
to those who are not yet members of a professional sports league. In Wood
v. National Basketball Ass'n, 4 the court held that Leon Wood, a rookie
drafted by the Philadelphia 76ers, could not sue to invalidate the league
salary cap even though he was not yet a member of the NBA player's union
when the cap was established. s The court's decision implied that CBAs
are negotiated on behalf of current and future players. 6 Therefore, if a
valid CBA exists, under the NSLE there is no remedy in antitrust law for a
party. This decision implies that all potential NBA rookies are bound by
those CBAs now in place. In addition, if the players agree to incorporate a
minimum age requirement into a current CBA, this case suggests that early
entry candidates could not pursue a remedy under antitrust law.
The protection of CBA terms from antitrust scrutiny has even
extended past the expiration of the agreement itself. In 1996, the Supreme
78. Id. at 1183-84.
79. 543 F.2d at 612.
80. 593 F.2d at 1175.
81. 600 F.2d 1193 (6thCir, 1979).
82. Id. at 1203.
83. Id.
84. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 959-60.
86. Id.
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Court, in Brown v. Pro Football,7 held that the NSLE does not expire until
the parties are sufficiently distant in time and circumstance from the
collective bargaining process."' This decision illustrates that the terms of a
CBA receive extensive protection and remain in force long after the CBA
expires. In order to meet the standard in Brown, the complete dissolution
of the bargaining relationship would be required.8 9 The Brown standard, in
conjunction with McCourt and Wood, indicates that if a minimum age
requirement were incorporated in a CBA, it would receive firm protection
from an antitrust challenge until the players' union ended its bargaining
relationship with team owners.
The significance of this exemption from antitrust scrutiny is that if
NBA players were to agree to a minimum age requirement, potential NBA
rookies would have little recourse under antitrust law. Haywood v.
National Basketball Ass'n 90 has previously demonstrated that a minimum
age requirement has serious antitrust implications.9' In Haywood, the
Supreme Court invalidated a NBA draft regulation that prohibited a
collegiate basketball player from being drafted until four years after high
school graduation.92  Also, in Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n,93 a
Connecticut District Court stated that a regulation prohibiting persons
under the age of twenty from playing professional hockey would be a
classic case of a per se illegal concerted boycott.94 Based on their findings,
the court in Linseman granted a nineteen year-old amateur a preliminary
injunction allowing him to play in the league.95 Because of the results in
Haywood and Linseman, a court would probably invalidate a minimum age
requirement if an antitrust challenge were available. However, if a
collective bargaining relationship exists, the ability to bring an antitrust
challenge disappears. If a minimum age requirement is incorporated into a
CBA, those who wish to challenge it would not have a viable antitrust
claim due to the NSLE. In the absence of the NSLE, a potential NBA
rookie could probably contest a minimum age requirement under antitrust
law, and given the Haywood and Linseman precedent, would likely
succeed. With the NSLE in operation, it is important to consider what
rights potential early entry candidates have outside antitrust law. The goal
here is to consider whether a NBA rookie has a cause of action under
federal or state discrimination law. Despite the antitrust exemption, if
87. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
88. Id. at 250.
89. Id.
90. 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
91. Id. at 1204-06.
92. Id. at 1206.
93. 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
94. Id. at 1320-23.
95. Id. at 1326.
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federal or state rights are violated, early entry candidates may be able to
invalidate a minimum age requirement.
Another hurdle for potential NBA rookies is that a binding arbitration
clause, which is common in professional sports league CBAs, may force
the claim to be decided by an arbitrator, rather than a court. Collective
bargaining agreements often include arbitration clauses which dictate that
certain causes of action must be heard by an independent arbitrator rather
than by a jury.96 However, there are instances where an employee's right to
a jury trial outweighs the league's preference for arbitration. In Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 97 the Supreme Court held that an employee's
statutory right to trial under the Equal Employment provisions of the Civil
Rights Act is not foreclosed by the prior submission of a claim to final
arbitration under a CBA's nondiscrimination clause.98 The court held that
an employee's civil rights were important enough to allow the employee to
pursue his/her rights independently under the Civil Rights Act and other
applicable state and federal statutes.99 Fearing that arbitration might not
adequately address the violation of these rights, the court elected to afford
plaintiffs the right to bypass arbitration.'0° The court suggested that "the
federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy
against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by
permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the
grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his
cause of action under Title VII"ll " While this decision involved a Title VII
claim, the court in Alexander held that when a plaintiff deems arbitration an
inadequate forum for the grievance, he/she can pursue his/her claim in
court. 02 Therefore, despite the existence of an arbitration clause within a
CBA, if the right is deemed important enough, a CBA will not keep the
issue outside of court. Bypassing an arbitration clause is an important first
step for potential NBA rookies attempting to claim reverse age
discrimination.
96. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)
(determining that when a CBA has an arbitration clause, a dispute must go to an arbitrator).
97. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
98. Id. at 60.
99. Id. at 48.
100. Id. at 49.
101. Id. at 59-60.
102. Id. at 60.
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III. AGE DISCRIMINATION LAW
A. The ADEA
Before determining whether discrimination law affords potential NBA
rookies protection from the imposition of a minimum age requirement, it is
necessary to understand the current state of age discrimination law. The
primary provision of federal age discrimination law is the ADEA.' °3 This
Act supplements Title VII, which affirmatively grants an employee the
right to be free from several forms of discrimination.'0 4 The purpose of the
act is "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather
than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; and to
help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from
the impact of age on employment."10 5  Section 623(a) of the Act
specifically makes age discrimination in employment illegal.3 6  The
section mandates that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunitiesor otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age; or (3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to
comply with this chapter.10 7
Age discrimination is a unique form of discrimination that creates an
unusual dilemma. It is not based on a fixed factor like other forms of
discrimination. Age discrimination "is seldom a matter of blind, arbitrary
prejudice which often exists for reasons of race, creed, color, national
origin, or sex. Age discrimination is a more subtle series of problems
based upon a combination of institutional factors and stereotyped
thinking."'108
Section 631 of the ADEA clearly states that it only provides an age
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1999).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (outlawing discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and
religious belief).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
107. Id.
108. Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age
Discrimination?: The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 786 (1997).
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discrimination claim to persons who are at least forty years of age.'°9 As a
consequence, there is no cause of action for individuals under forty. In its
initial form, the ADEA also included an age limit of sixty-five years in
order to receive protection."0 Congress later amended the ADEA to
eradicate this age limit."' By setting the minimum at age forty, Congress
attempted to ensure that the ADEA protects older workers.
112
However, in the past Congress has recognized that age discrimination
can affect the young, as well as the old. In 1975, it passed the Age
Discrimination Act ("ADA") which prohibits age discrimination in federal
programs." 3 By not setting a minimum age for protection under the ADA,
Congress suggested that the young are often subject to discrimination and,
therefore, warrant protection as well.14 Strangely, this logic did not apply
when Congress passed the ADEA. If Congress had lowered the minimum
age for ADEA protection, they would still have achieved their goal of
protecting the elderly from discrimination. However, as it stands, in order
to challenge a minimum age requirement, a plaintiff under the age of forty
has to argue that the requirement violates a right other than the right to be
free from age discrimination.
In order to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination, the
employee, who bears the burden of proof, must show that: (1) he/she was a
member of the protected age group; (2) his/her performance met the
employer's legitimate expectation; (3) he/she was subject to materially
adverse employment action; and (4) younger employees were treated more
favorably." 6 The first prong requires that the employee was a member of
the protected age group, and since the ADEA only protects those over
forty, it eliminates younger employees claims. The fourth prong
specifically requires that older workers were slighted, thereby acting with
109. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994).
110. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602, 607 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1994)).
111. Bryan B. Woodruff, Note, Unprotected Until Forty: The Limited Scope of the Age
Discrimnzation in Employment Act of 1967,73 IND. L.J. 1295, 1295 (1998).
112. Id. at 1298.
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-07 (1994).
114. "[I]ts provisions are broad and it is the intent of the committee that it apply to age
discrimination at all age levels, from the youngest to the oldest." 121 CONG. REc. 9212
(Apr. 8, 1975) (statement of Rep. Brademas).
115. Plaintiffs have frequently brought equal protection claims in order to invalidate
minimum age requirements. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1989)
(involving a challenge to the minimum age requirement for a dance hall on the grounds that
it violates the right of association guaranteed by the First Amendment); Stiles v. Blunt, 912
F.2d 260, 261 (8th Cir. 1990) (discussing a potential political candidate's attempt to
invalidate an age requirement for candidacy under the Fourteenth Amendment); Mason v.
Edwards, 482 F.2d 1076, 1076-77 (6th Cir. 1973) (involving an equal protection challenge
to a political office age requirement).
116. Elguindy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 903 F. Supp. 1260, 1266 (N.D. 111. 1995).
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the first prong to ensure that older workers are not discriminated against in
the workforce. This test for a prima facie case does not afford an
opportunity for reverse discrimination claims.
However, the ADEA does not preempt state age discrimination
laws. 17 This lack of preemption indicates that state law can supplement the
protection afforded under the ADEA. This paves the way for influential
state legislation on age discrimination, such as New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination, which prohibits age discrimination without targeting a
specific age group."" When interpreting their own laws, states have the
opportunity to allow reverse age discrimination claims. A lack of
preemption allows a litany of age discrimination claims outside of the
ADEA. Therefore, the prima facie test for age discrimination claims does
not necessarily need to be applied to state law claims of age discrimination.
If the state expands its protection against age discrimination, then the test
may be altered. Even though there has been some controversy concerning
whether the ADEA allows reverse age discrimination claims to those over
forty, it is this lack of preemption that allowed the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler"9 to construe its own statute to
permit these claims. 2 °
B. Reverse Age Discrimination
In order for NBA rookies to have a viable claim to contest the
implementation of a minimum age requirement, they will likely turn to
reverse age discrimination. Reverse age discrimination claims are based on
the notion that one was discriminated against because he/she was too
young, rather than too old.'2' The word 'reverse' indicates that typical age
discrimination claims assert that the plaintiff suffered discrimination
because he/she was too old. In general, reverse age discrimination claims
derive from the successful attempts of plaintiffs claiming reverse
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act. 2 For example, under Title VII,
"a plaintiff who is not a member of a racial minority may state a cause of
action for discrimination on the basis of race."'2' These types of claims
117. Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1989) (stating that '[the federal Act
does not preempt state age discrimination laws").
118. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 1993).
119. 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999).
120. Id. at 957.
121. Maxine H. Neuhauser & Mark D. Lurie, Extending the Scope of the Law Against
Discrimination, 156 N.J.L.J. 868, 868 (1999) (discussing Bergen).
122. John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Reverse Age Discrimination, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
1, 1993, at 3.
123. Id.
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have been utilized in the past to invalidate affirmative action programs.124
Despite the general success of reverse discrimination claims, these claims
have been rare.'2
The primary explanation for the limited success of reverse age
discrimination claims is that the ADEA has not been interpreted to allow
them. 26 In order to have a valid age discrimination claim under the ADEA,
a plaintiff over the age of forty must allege that he/she suffered
discrimination because he/she was too old. Since most minimum age
requirements set limits at ages far younger than forty, it is difficult to
establish a prima facie case. Nonetheless, the issue has been presented to a
court before. The critical case that considered reverse age discrimination
was Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc.'27 In Hamilton, the Seventh Circuit held
that the ADEA does not provide a remedy for reverse age discrimination.
2
8
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit relied on two earlier cases129 and held
that although the ADEA does not prohibit reverse age discrimination
claims for those under forty, it also does not authorize them. 30 After
Hamilton, there may be little room for reverse discrimination claims under
the ADEA, not to mention room for an eighteen year-old (an age far below
the ADEA threshold) to claim age discrimination. Despite the Hamilton
decision there have been continuous attempts to challenge the ADEA's
stance on reverse age discrimination.'
Even though the ADEA does not yet allow reverse age discrimination
claims, there is a movement against the ADEA that could open the door to
such claims. The goal of the anti-ADEA movement is not necessarily to
promote reverse discrimination claims, but to attempt to address the
disparate impact of the Act. 32 If this concern is eventually addressed, it
would help open the door for reverse age discrimination claims. The crux
124. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (involving a white
plaintiff who succeeded in invalidating a medical school's affirmative action program under
Title VII).
125. Furfaro & Josephson, supra note 122, at 3.
126. Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1992) (determining that
the ADEA does not permit reverse discrimination claims).
127. 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
128. Id. at 1228.
129. Karlen v. City Coll., 837 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that early
retirement plans that favor older employees are not suspect); Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848
F.2d 276, 278 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the ADEA does not prohibit employers from
treating older persons more generously than others).
130. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228.
131. See, e.g., Dittman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 116 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to
reach the question of whether the ADEA provides a remedy for reverse age discrimination);
Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing a reverse discrimination
claim under the ADEA made by a plaintiff who was too young to receive severance benefits
from a pension plan).
132. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 108, at 793-97.
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of this movement is the premise that the ADEA is itself an example of
reverse discrimination. 33 The argument is that by setting the age threshold
at forty, the ADEA transforms federal law "into a mandate for preferential
treatment for workers over forty."'' 4 In addition, because older workers
tend to be white males, the Act has the unintended effect of discriminating
against minorities and women.3 5 However, the solution to the problem
may not be to lower the age threshold. Some argue that the ADEA is
altogether unnecessary. 136 Whether or not the ADEA is necessary, there is
evidence that it has shifted wealth towards older Americans.137 Professor
Samuel Issacharoff states that, "[t]hrough a carefully orchestrated assault
on mandatory retirement and targeted employee retirement incentive
programs, the AARP [(American Association of Retired Persons)] -inspired
amendments of the ADEA provoked a significant one-time transfer of
resources to the generation whose members are currently drawing to the
close of their working careers.' 38 As a result, the ADEA is the most far
reaching discrimination statute and continues to offer benefits to the most-
advantaged group of people. 3 9
The impact of the enforcement of the ADEA may eventually result in
a change in current law. One ADEA amendment that Congress may
eventually consider is an extension of protection to those under age forty.
Discrimination against the young is certainly evident in everyday life.
Certain restrictions are unquestionably valid because of their intent to
protect children from harm."40 However, discrimination against the young
is often purposefully predicated on stereotypes that are without merit when
applied to individual cases. For example, a shopkeeper may wish to restrict
the age of his/her employees because he/she thinks that young employees
133. Clint Bolick, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Equal Opportunity or
Reverse Discrimination?, POLICY ANALYSIS, No. 82, at http:llwww.cato.org/pub/pas/pa082.
html (last modified Feb. 10, 1987).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. Bolick argues that the ADEA confers artificial advantages and, therefore,
contributes to the erosion of free enterprise. He advocates a positive civil rights agenda,
which he considers to be a defensive strategy. Id.
137. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 108, at 782-83.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 836-37.
140. Since minimum age requirements are meant to protect children, they would not
likely be classified as arbitrary, as discrimination claims require. The employment of minors
under age fourteen has been statutorily prohibited in any occupation since 1938. Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 212(c) (2000). The physical and psychological
dangers to working children have always been of utmost congressional and administrative
concern. See, e.g., 81 CONG. REc. 7930-31 (July 31, 1937) (statement of Sen. Wheeler);
Employment of Minors Between 14 and 16 Years of Age, 15 Fed. Reg. 395 (Jan. 25, 1950)
(to be codified at 4 C.F.R. 1983); Child Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 570.2, 570.33(f)(4)
and 570.119 (2000).
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are more likely to steal from the store. Regardless of the merit of the
shopkeeper's rationale, this type of restriction is predicated upon a
stereotype and should be covered under the ADEA. Currently, there is no
mechanism to prevent this form of discrimination in employment. To
address this form of discrimination, the ADEA should not restrict its
protection to the elderly, but rather extend its protection to the young.
Making this positive adjustment will not alter the original congressional
intent of protecting the elderly from discrimination because it would still
command the same protection for them. In addition, employers could still
base their employment decisions on experience or maturity.1 41 They could
not, however, base their employment decisions on stereotypes. If Congress
were to institute this change, they would more appropriately address the
original goal of preventing discrimination on the basis of age.142 At the
very least, this issue illustrates a gaping hole in the ADEA. The fact that
there is no protection against blatant discrimination for young employees
may prompt an amendment in the future. This demonstrates that the
provisions of the ADEA are vulnerable to change.
C. State Law Claims
As mentioned above, the ADEA does not preempt state law regarding
age discrimination. This fact has afforded states the opportunity to develop
their own laws governing age discrimination. While most states have
remained within the scope of the ADEA, one significant variation occurred
in New Jersey. 143 This variation demonstrates that age discrimination law
is highly volatile and may ultimately result in greater protection for
younger employees. New Jersey's governing discrimination law is titled
the Law Against Discrimination ("LAD").'" The LAD prohibits age
discrimination in two sections. Section 10:5-4 provides that "[a]l persons
shall have the opportunity to obtain employment.., without discrimination
because of... age,... subject only to conditions and limitations applicable
alike to all persons. This opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a
civil right."' 45 Section 10:5-12 makes the practice of age discrimination
unlawful:
It shall be unlawful employment practice, or, as the case may be,
an unlawful discrimination ... [flor an employer, because of
the ...age... of any individual.. .to refuse to hire or employ or to
141. Woodruff, supra note 111, at 1310.
142. Id.
143. Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 960 (N.J. 1999) (holding that
under New Jersey law, an individual may sue for reverse age discrimination).
144. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 - 10:5-42 (West 1999).
145. Id. § 10:5-4.
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bar or to discharge or require to retire.. .from employment such
individual or to discriminate against such individual in
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.
146
In the landmark case of Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 47 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, unlike the ADEA, the LAD allows
young workers to make reverse age discrimination claims.45 The court
determined that since the language in the LAD did not explicitly limit the
Act's application to those over forty (as the ADEA did), and since
prohibiting reverse age discrimination claims would render certain portions
of the LAD "inoperative," the statute must permit reverse age
discrimination claims. 149 The court based its interpretation of the LAD on
its express language, which it construed as clear and unambiguous."O The
fact that the court utilized a literal interpretation of the statute demonstrates
the New Jersey legislature's intention to prohibit all age discrimination.
However, the court does indicate that the plaintiff bears a heavy burden in
proving a reverse age discrimination claim."' The plaintiff still must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.52 The court reconfigured
the standard test and created a "heightened 'reverse-discrimination'
formulation."' 153  Under the Bergen Commercial Bank test, the plaintiff
must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) background circumstances supporting the suspicion that the
defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the
majority; (2) that he was performing at a level that met his
employer's legitimate expectations; (3) that he was nevertheless
fired; and (4) that he was replaced with a candidate sufficiently
older to permit an inference of age discrimination.
1 54
Even though this test was specifically adapted to Sisler's situation, this
case suggests that in New Jersey, a NBA rookie over age eighteen, who is
refused admittance into the NBA despite qualifications, may have a valid
age discrimination claim.
New Jersey is not the only state where a plaintiff has attempted to
146. Id. § 10:5-12.
147. 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999).
148. Id. at 960.
149. Construing the LAD to allow age discrimination claims only to those over forty
would render section 2.1 of the LAD inoperative. This section outlines the only exceptions
to the age discrimination provisions in the LAD. The section indicates a clear desire to
protect workers over the age of eighteen. Id. at 952.
150. Id. at 950, 957.
151. Id. at960.
152. Id. at 958.
153. Id. at 959.
154. Id.
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bring a reverse age discrimination claim based on a statute."' While no
advance has been as significant as New Jersey's, the proliferation of claims
may indicate that the frequent consideration of this right may eventually
lead more legislatures and/or courts to recognize it. In California, a
prospective automobile lessee challenged a minimum age requirement for
car rentals as a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. 156 In Lazar v. Hertz
Corp.,15 7  the plaintiff brought a class action suit pleading age
discrimination on his behalf, and on behalf of others between the ages of
sixteen and twenty-five. 158  The court held that the statute governing
vehicle rental agreements barred application of the Unruh Act and was
therefore determinative. 5 9 On this basis, the court did not allow the
plaintiff a cause of action.' 6° Because the Unruh Act states that it cannot be
construed to confer any rights or privileges that are conditioned or limited
by law, the court held that the Act must defer to the vehicle regulation
statute. 16  Construing the Unruh Act in this manner, the court concluded
that the Act does not afford an age discrimination claim for refusing to rent
vehicles to those under age twenty-five.162 Although this case barred a
reverse age discrimination claim, the manner in which the court handled it
demonstrates that this area of law is vulnerable to a successful finding of
reverse age discrimination. The court was forced to defer to a vehicle
regulation in order to bar the claim. 63 The court did not explicitly bar the
claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. This decision indicates that in the
absence of another determinative regulation, there may be room to
challenge reverse age discrimination under the Unruh Act.
The Lazar and Bergen Commercial Bank decisions demonstrate that
under state law, reverse age discrimination claims can be successful. The
fact that the Lazar court did not immediately dismiss the claim under the
Unruh Civil Rights Act indicates that reverse age discrimination claims
have the potential to succeed in California. The court did not take issue
with reverse age discrimination claims generally. Instead, it determined
that the vehicle regulation prohibited the claim.' 64  Although they areprogressive, New Jersey and California are very influential states. The fact
155. Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 69 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that there was no cause of action under the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
156. Id.; see also Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. Cwy. CODE § 51 (West 1999) (declaring
that all persons are free and entitled to equal accommodations in business establishments).
157. 69 Cal. App. 4th 1494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
158. Id. at 1500.
159. Id. at 1508-10.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1504.
162. Id. at 1509.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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that reverse age discrimination is accepted in one, and not completely
dismissed in the other, indicates the potential for viable reverse age
discrimination claims. Age discrimination law is extremely vulnerable to
change, especially through state statutes. Although this change is far from
definite, it is important to remember that it is possible. If such a change
occurs, potential NBA rookies may have state age discrimination claims.
D. Equal Protection and State Law
While the downfall-or the adaptation-of the ADEA is by no means
a reality, reverse age discrimination claims may persist either directly
through state law or indirectly through constitutional challenges.1 6' The
success, if any, of these alternative methods for challenging discrimination
could eventually help legitimize reverse age discrimination claims.
Another area of vulnerability for minimum age requirements concerns
equal protection. Equal protection under the law is guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.166 This amendment ensures
that federal and state governments apply their laws equally. The Equal
Protection Clause only applies to government action and not to actions of
private citizens. The Equal Protection Clause is implicated whenever the
government classifies citizens. If it is proven that the government action
purposefully treats similarly situated people differently, a classification will
violate equal protection facially or in its implementation.' 67
In the case of the NBA, if a minimum age requirement is construed as
being enforced by the state (a form of "state action"), then a potential
rookie may have the authority to bring an equal protection claim. In order
to challenge a restriction as a violation of the Constitution the state action
doctrine requires government involvement. There are two strands of state
action. There is the public function doctrine that allows a constitutional
challenge if a private individual or group is authorized by the state to
perform functions that are traditionally viewed as governmental in
nature. 16  This doctrine relates to the type of activity carried out by the
165. The extent of current state law claims are discussed above. Constitutional
challenges to reverse age discrimination are based on the Fourteenth Amendment, which
grants equal protection under the law. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
166. Id.
167. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 251-52 (1976) (denying recourse to black
applicants to a police force who claimed that the written test disproportionately hurt black
applicants, because there was no proof of purpose).
168. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (holding that the Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation could not forbid the distribution of religious literature in a town completely
owned by the corporation); see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 311 (1996)
(determining that a park left in trust could not discriminate on the basis of race since it
served the community and thus, had a public function).
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actor. There is also the state involvement doctrine that transforms a private
individual's conduct into state action if the state is heavily involved in
those activities.' 69 If the government benefits from a private party's
activities, then those acts will be deemed state action. Applying the state
involvement strand, courts will often find state action if there is joint
participation between the private actor and the government.' 70 Given the
success of previous arguments alleging state action, it is reasonable to
suggest that a NBA player could bring a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Stevens v. New York Racing
Ass'n,171 the Eastern District of New York held that a plaintiff should be
able to demonstrate state action because the defendant was a racing
association that received considerable funds from the state. 172 While a
racing association may have stronger ties to the state than a sports
franchise, this case demonstrates that state action can be invoked when
there is a significant level of government involvement. This case suggests
that if the "[s]tate has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with [the regulated entity]... it must be recognized as a
joint participant in the challenged activity."' 73  Under this standard, if a
player can demonstrate a significant level of government involvement with
his NBA franchise, he may allege an equal protection violation.
Once a player invokes the equal protection clause, proving actionable
discrimination will be an even bigger hill to climb. There are three levels
of review that courts will utilize for equal protection claims. Strict scrutiny
review invokes the highest level of court inspection. Courts will apply
strict scrutiny review to any statute which is based upon a suspect
classification or which impairs a fundamental right. Race is the typical
example of a suspect class, while the right to vote typifies a fundamental
right.' 74 When strict scrutiny is utilized, a classification will be upheld only
if it is necessary to promote a compelling government interest.'75  The
169. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1948) (demonstrating the classic example of
state action and holding that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant would
constitute state action); see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 394 (1967) (invalidating
an amendment to the California Constitution that forbade the state from limiting an
individual's right to discriminate in real estate transactions because it constituted "state
action").
170. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982) (holding that when a
private party and a state official act together, the resulting joint participation constitutes state
action).
171. 665 F. Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
172. Id. at 171.
173. Id. (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth. 365 U.S. 715,725 (1961)).
174. City of Richmond v. L.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500-01 (1989) (declaring that
race is always a suspect classification); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 686 (1966) (striking down a poll tax as a violation of the fundamental right to vote).
175. J.A Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 472-73.
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"middle-level" standard of review requires intermediate scrutiny by the
court. Here, the classification must be substantially related to an important
government objective. 176  This standard of review has been applied to
classifications based upon gender.177  While courts have not directly
addressed the issue, the elderly, who are already protected in the workplace
under the ADEA, may eventually receive constitutional protection from
age discrimination with an intermediate level of scrutiny. Increasingly,
unpopular groups who do not qualify as suspect classes are protected under
this standard of review. 17' The least intense level of scrutiny is "mere-
rationality" review. Mere-rationality review applies to statutes that are not
based on a suspect class, that do not involve quasi-suspect categories, and
that do not impair a fundamental right. This level of review is typically
applied to economic regulations. Under this level of scrutiny, a law will be
unconstitutional only if it is purely arbitrary. 7 9 Age discrimination, as it
applies to the young, warrants mere rationality review."O As the ADEA
does not extend protection to the young, the case law resulting from equal
protection claims implies that discrimination against younger employees
would involve mere-rationality review, if state action is found.
One example of an equal protection claim that challenged a minimum
age requirement is Baccus v. Karger 8 1 In Baccus, the plaintiff challenged
the New York Board of Law Examiner's requirements for taking the bar
examination.1 2 The requirements were that the applicant: (1) was over
twenty-one years of age; and (2) commenced the study of law after his/her
eighteenth birthday.' 83 While the court upheld the first requirement, they
found that the second requirement violated the United States
Constitution.' 4 The first requirement was upheld under the State's power
to protect the public.185 The court found that the state had an interest in
176. Id. at 535.
177. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (holding that an alcohol restriction that
differentiates between genders violates equal protection).
178. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996), the Supreme Court struck down a
Colorado constitutional amendment that would have stopped the state, or any of its citizens,
from giving the same protections to homosexuals that other groups receive. While the court
formally used a "mere-rationality" standard, Romer provided more heightened protection for
gays and lesbians than the typical mere rationality standard requires. Id. at 632-35.
179. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 82-83 (1911) (applying the
"mere-rationality" standard of review).
180. Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1976) (holding that the
statute setting the mandatory retirement age for police officers was subject to rational
relationship review rather than strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause).
181. 692 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
182. Id. at 291.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 300.
185. Id. at297.
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establishing a general fitness/maturity requirement as a precondition for
admission to the bar.' 86 The court emphasized that such arbitrary line
drawing is acceptable, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the required
age was "very wide of any reasonable mark."'1 87 However, the court was
not satisfied that the second requirement "rationally advanced New York's
legitimate interest in protecting the public from the pitfalls of professional
immaturity." '88  Thus, the court held that the eighteen year-old age
requirement was not rationally related to its purpose. 89 The court
determined that it was unfair to strip an individual of his/her academic
achievement because of age (this requirement would have forced the
plaintiff to start law school over).' 90 The opinion states that, "[a]lthough
their practice in the profession may legitimately and temporarily be
delayed, their academic achievements should not be stripped of their
substantive meaning simply because they, by virtue of their precociousness,
were able to pursue those rigors at an early age."' 9' The significance of this
decision is that it represents a plaintiff's triumph over the "rationally
related" standard, which usually provides great deference to the defendant
in equal protection cases. Here, the court held that the regulation failed to
meet a standard that affords great deference to the discriminating
institution, demonstrating that age discrimination is an area where courts
would be willing to extend protection.
The success of this equal protection challenge demonstrates that, in
theory, reverse age discrimination claims are valid. Here, a plaintiff proved
that an incident of reverse age discrimination violated his constitutional
rights. The decision in Baccus prohibits a form of arbitrary discrimination
based on youth.' 92 This validation suggests that there is merit in protecting
the right to equal opportunity for the young. While constructing the exact
same claim for a NBA player might be difficult, recognition of such a right
in this area of constitutional law suggests that it is not far-fetched to
recognize a similar right in employment discrimination law.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE: THE NEXUS, AGE DISCRIMINATION MEETS
SPORTS LAW
Traditional sports law suggests that if players agree to a minimum age
186. Id. at 296.
187. Id. at 300 (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
188. Id. at 298.
189. Id. at 300.
190. Id. at 298-300.
191. Id. at 300.
192. Id. at 300.
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requirement in a CBA, then it must be legal. 93 In addition to the fact that
acceptance of such a requirement is unlikely given the players union's
distaste for such a measure, there are several other problems with this
rationale.194 If such a requirement is part of a CBA, then the CBA will be
exempted from antitrust scrutiny. 195 If the antitrust exemption does not
apply, Haywood suggests that a unilaterally imposed minimum age
requirement would violate antitrust law."' Yet, if a minimum age
requirement is embedded in a CBA, Wood suggests that the provision
would even apply to rookies who are not yet part of the league. 97 Despite
the above analysis, even if a minimum age requirement can escape antitrust
scrutiny, it is not necessarily valid.
Even though antitrust law minimizes players' ability to bring
successful claims in court, it is important to explore all areas of relief for
potential NBA players who want to join the NBA. Antitrust law does not
necessarily provide the only remedy for professional athletes. In order to
discover alternative remedies, it is necessary to probe the legal implications
of a minimum age requirement. Antitrust law looks at the effects of the
imposition of such a requirement. In other words, antitrust law prevents
collusive efforts that are in restraint of trade. 198 However, antitrust law only
examines the commercial effects of the regulation; it does not analyze the
content of the actual provision. In order to fully probe the legality of a
minimum age requirement, it is also necessary to explore the legality of the
substance of the provision. In order to be legal, the regulation, in addition
to its resulting effect, must comport with federal and state law. Despite the
protection afforded to a CBA, it can not protect a restriction that is
substantively illegal. Therefore, it is necessary to explore not only the
collusive efforts of the league under the scope of antitrust, but also the
content of the potential rule.
I have examined age discrimination protection in two different
contexts in order to determine whether the content of a minimum age
requirement violates federal or state rights. I have examined the
requirement under the ADEA and relevant state law. I have also
considered the impact of potential equal protection claims. The ultimate
questions I ask are: 1) what remedy do NBA rookies have; and 2) under
193. McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that
provisions in fairly bargained CBAs receive antitrust protection).
194. Age Old Question, Players Union Vehemently Opposed to Age Limit, supra note 30.
195. McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1203.
196. Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1207 (1971) (enjoining the
enforcement of a rule that required NBA players to be out of high school for four years).
197. Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959-64 (2d Cir. 1987) (establishing
that CBAs apply to all current and future players).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1999) (stating that "every... combination.., in restraint of
trade.., is hereby declared to be illegal").
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what authority do they have a claim? A NBA rookie would not have a
claim under the ADEA because a potential minimum age requirement
would be set around age twenty, which is far below the forty year age
requirement necessary for the ADEA. However, as mentioned above, there
have been challenges to the ADEA. Some believe that the ADEA
represents reverse age discrimination and should be eliminated altogether.
Others argue that Congress should eliminate the age requirement in the
ADEA. Regardless of the viewpoint, it is evident that the ADEA is a
viable candidate for some type of future reform. If Congress wishes to end
the controversy surrounding the ADEA, it may ultimately decide to
eliminate the age requirement. If it does so, then the test for reverse age
discrimination would most likely resemble the New Jersey LAD, since that
is the only current example of what is necessary for a successful claim.
Construing the ADEA to protect NBA rookies is a difficult task. The
ADEA typically protects against isolated events of discrimination rather
than discriminatory regulations. Discriminatory regulations fit more
comfortably under an equal protection analysis. However, given the
prohibition in section 623(a), it seems that the ADEA does in fact apply to
regulations.199 Section 623(a)(1) makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail
or refuse to hire.., any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age .... ,200 If the NBA, or the team that enforces the rule, is viewed as the
employer, this section of the ADEA would allow a cause of action for a
NBA rookie if he was denied employment because of his age (assuming
that the age requirement no longer existed).
If the age threshold in the ADEA were eliminated, the analysis would
be comparable to that utilized under the LAD, which suggests that a
201potential NBA rookie would have a cause of action. Most definitely,
reverse age discrimination claims would, if allowed, warrant a more
heightened scrutiny similar to the one utilized in Bergen Commercial
Bank.0 2 The burden on the plaintiff would be much harder to meet.
However, the primary consideration is not whether the NBA rookie would
succeed in his claim, but whether the rookie even has a right to bring a
claim.
Using Bergen Commercial Bank's literal interpretation of the LAD,
and assuming that the ADEA is amended to change or abolish the age
threshold, the potential NBA rookie subjected to a minimum age
199. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
200. Id.
201. Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 958 (N.J. 1999) establishes a test
that places a heavy burden on the plaintiff to prove discrimination. This is the only current
test for reverse age discrimination claims.
202. Id. at 959.
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requirement might have state and federal law claims. At the very least, if a
potential NBA rookie brings a claim in New Jersey, the court would not
preliminarily dismiss the case. This is an essential development worth
noting. There is a path of vulnerability in age discrimination law that, if
treaded upon more, may ultimately lead to the elimination of minimum age
requirements, such as those proposed by David Stem. The NBA, and every
other employer, should be aware of a potential change because it may
ultimately challenge the institution of a minimum age requirement.
Certainly, if reverse age discrimination claims are allowed, plaintiffs
may have a very hard time proving them. Even the court in Bergen
Commercial Bank acknowledged that such claims command a higher
burden of proof.03 While meeting this burden of proof is highly fact
specific, there is one thing that will fall in favor of the potential NBA
rookie in every case. Past experience has shown that eighteen and nineteen
year-old players can compete in the league. Although this may have more
implications for the equal protection analysis2°4 (mere rationality requires
that a rule cannot be arbitrary) than the reverse age discrimination analysis,
it will at least help illustrate that an eighteen year-old can perform at a level
that not only meets, but exceeds, employer expectations. Both Kobe
Bryant and Kevin Garnett came to the NBA straight from high school and
both had an immediate impact on the league. By the age of twenty-the
age where the threshold will be set- they were both legitimate stars. The
success of Bryant and Garnett casts doubt on the logic of a twenty year
minimum age requirement.
At the very least, their success demonstrates that age is not an
occupational qualification and therefore, such a provision would not be
exempt under either 8 623(f)(1) of the ADEA or section 10:5-2.1 of the
2051LAD. Section 623(f)(1) permits an employer to discriminate based upon
age "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business ... .206 The
LAD also contains a bona fide occupational qualification exception which
is set forth in section 10:5-2.1.207 If the NBA could demonstrate that age is
an occupational qualification for performance in the league, then it would
203. Id.
204. In terms of equal protection analysis, the past success of young NBA players will
help demonstrate that a minimum age requirement distinguishes between similarly situated
groups of people (in terms of their ability to play basketball). This could help prove
purposeful discrimination, a form of discrimination that is prohibited under the
disproportionate impact theory. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 252 (1976) (denying a
claim that an application which included a written test disproportionately hurt black
applicants because there was no proof of purpose).
205. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-2.1 (1999).
206. 29 U.S.C § 623(f)(1).
207. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-2.1.
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be able to establish rules that optimize the quality of league play.
However, the success of Bryant and Garnett demonstrates that a player
does not have to be over the age of twenty in order to bring skills to the
league that will increase the quality of play, as well as increase the
popularity of the league.
A restriction that is justified under the occupational qualification
exception could withstand a challenge. An employer is allowed to choose
his/her employees with some discretion. Minimum age requirements that
prevent child labor have withstood scrutiny because they protect children
from harm, but the success of Bryant and Garnett will work against the
league's justification of such a requirement. In fact, their success makes
any such regulation look arbitrary-exactly the type of provision that
would succumb even to the rational basis review illustrated in Baccus.2 s In
addition, the bona fide occupational qualification exception requires that a
rule be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business." 209 If Bryant and Garnett can compete below the age of twenty,
then an age limit does not appear justified as "reasonably necessary,"
particularly in light of the NBA's reliance on both of them to promote their
own success.
210
Even though protecting its younger players from a difficult adjustment
is a legitimate goal of the NBA, this concern may not be within their
territory. The law may eventually mandate that the responsibility of
determining preparedness for the NBA will fall on the players themselves,
on the natural selection of the draft, and on the free agency process. In
addition, the fact that teams continually draft players under the age of
twenty illustrates the inappropriateness of such a requirement. If teams
continue to draft these players despite the problems their movement into
the NBA creates for the league, as well as the NCAA, then common sense
suggests that the problem is not worth addressing. It is obvious from this
trend that the problems are not so overwhelming that they are forcing teams
to alter their drafting strategies. If the cost of the problem presented was
greater than the value of drafting a player early, then teams would be
inclined to change their drafting strategies. However, as the statistics
indicate, early entry is on the rise, rather than the decline.21 Therefore,
given the NBA success of those under twenty and the natural selection
process already in place, a potential plaintiff could have a legitimate
208. Baccus v. Karger, 692 F. Supp. 290, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (invalidating a minimum
age requirement for the study of law in New York State).
209. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994).
210. Id. In 1998, the NBA All-Star game promotional campaigns heralded Kobe Bryant,
then nineteen, as the successor to Michael Jordan. Michael Hiestand, Few Highlights from
Long NBA Weekend, USA TODAY, May 24, 1998, at 2C.
211. 1999 NBA Draft Underclassmen, supra note 1.
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argument to invalidate a minimum age requirement, despite the
occupational qualification exception in § 623(f).
Finally, there is the issue of challenging a minimum age requirement
on equal protection grounds. The right to equal protection under the law is
a constitutional right. The problem is, the NBA minimum age
requirement would not be a federal or state law, in fact it would not even be
a law. It would merely be an organizational regulation. The question is,
could a NBA player make a valid equal protection claim? Since the
government cannot interfere with private regulations, in order to test the
constitutionality of a minimum age requirement, a litigant needs to invoke
the state action doctrine.213 State action necessitates sufficient participation
by a governmental entity in order to invoke constitutional protection.
2
1
4
While the NBA is an established, private organization, it may not be far-
fetched to parallel a NBA franchise to a state government. States are
intricately involved with their teams. They allot tax revenue in order to
build stadiums. They throw parades for teams that win. Teams often play
into a state's identity and consciousness. For example, government
officials are often intricately involved with their teams. New York City
Mayor Rudolph Guiliani often appears at New York Yankees games and is
famous for his friendly wagers with other city mayors. Former President
Bill Clinton often attends Arkansas basketball games. In fact, states are so
intricately involved with their teams that location issues frequently appear
as referendums on ballots. 5 In recent years, several cities floated
referendums considering whether to allocate tax dollars to the construction
216of new stadiums and arenas. Given the connection between city and
franchise, it may not be difficult to prove that NBA teams are involved
with their state.
If state involvement can be proved, with the precedent of Shelley, it
may be unconstitutional for a court to enforce a minimum age requirement
212. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
213. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (refusing to enforce a private racially-
restrictive covenant because it would constitute state action and, therefore, violate the
Fourteenth Amendment).
214. Id. at 2.
215. Joe Donatelli, Election '98: Voters Play on Stadium Referendums, at http://www.
naplesnews.comtoday/elect/al 1144p.htm (last modified Nov. 4, 1998) (noting that stadium
referendums were approved by voters in Denver and San Diego in 1998, while voters in the
1997 election defeated similar referendums in various other cities including Pittsburgh,
Seattle, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, and Columbus).
216. Home Sweet Home: Tim Duncan Can Probably Stop Worrying About Relocating, at
http:l/www.cnnsi.com/basketball/nba/news/1999/11/02/spurs.-arena.aplhtml (last modified
Nov. 3, 1999) (describing the effort to keep the 1999 World Champion Spurs in San
Antonio); Packers Ask For Help From Taxpayers, at http:l/www.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
2000/0122/307173.html (last modified Jan. 23, 2000) (discussing the Green Bay Packer's
attempt to solicit tax money in order to renovate Lambeau field).
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in the NBA.217 In Shelley, the Supreme Court refused to enforce a private
restrictive covenant that denied property to African-Americans.
218
Although Shelley concerned a racial restriction, it demonstrated the
Supreme Court's reluctance to enforce a discriminatory regulation. Even
though age discrimination is clearly different, Shelley suggests a general
distaste for enforcing discriminatory regulations.
If a potential player does have the right to challenge the law under an
equal protection claim, since the regulation is not based on a suspect
classification, does not involve a "quasi-suspect" classification, and does
not impair a fundamental right, the NBA needs only to demonstrate that the
minimum age requirement is rationally related to its objective. When
rational basis is applied, the plaintiff will most likely fail; however, the
plaintiff does not always fail, as demonstrated in Baccus.219 Obviously the
argument here involves delicate construction along with a group of
assumptions. The leaps required in order for a NBA player to have a
reverse age discrimination claim are unprecedented. However, it is
important to open the window to afford a plaintiff an opportunity to possess
a claim. If the window of protection from age discrimination in
employment expands, there could be a dramatic ripple effect, extending
into professional sports. If the opportunity for reverse age discrimination
claims expands, the control that sports leagues maintain over their own
restrictions will undoubtedly shrink.
V. CONCLUSION
Antitrust law is absolutely clear on the legality of a potential minimum
age requirement in the NBA. As long as the requirement is part of a CBA,
then, according to current case law, the minimum age requirement is valid.
Despite the volumes of scholarly writings that consider minimum age
requirements in CBAs, there are very few writings that consider the legality
of a minimum age requirement in a major professional sport outside the
scope of antitrust law. In terms of the legality of the content of such a
requirement, it is necessary to turn to employment discrimination law.
Employment discrimination law justifies minimum age requirements in a
context outside antitrust law. In short, federal age discrimination law does
not offer any protection against minimum age requirements because the
applicable law, the ADEA, only applies to those over age forty. The
purpose of this comment is to suggest that the law governing minimum age
requirements is not as clear as it looks. The ADEA may be subject to
217. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 21-23.
218. Id.
219. Baccus v. Karger, 692 F. Supp. 290, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1988 (invalidating a minimum
age requirement for the study of law in New York State).
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change. It has been challenged on multiple occasions for its age thresholds
and may eventually be amended. In addition, an aggressive New Jersey
law prohibiting age discrimination may have implications regarding the
validity of minimum age requirements. The Bergen Commercial Bank case
in New Jersey, and other challenges to the restraints of reverse age
discrimination claims, may eventually open the floodgates to claims that
could ultimately spell the downfall of minimum age requirements. In
addition, constitutional law, through careful construction, could challenge
arbitrary minimum age requirements imposed by private organizations,
such as the NBA. If the vulnerabilities develop further, then the
cumulative effect may be that the first hurdle, the right to make the claim,
will be overcome in reverse age discrimination cases. If this happens,
antitrust violations will not be the only claims that NBA lawyers will have
to worry about. Although right now a potential NBA rookie does not have
much legal ground to stand on, if the trend of reverse age discrimination
claims continues, the NBA, like every other private employer, should take
notice. The ripple effect of allowing reverse age discrimination claims
could eventually mean that the league must keep its doors open, despite its
honest intention of protecting younger players who are at a greater risk of
failing. Ultimately, potential NBA players will have no one to look after
them but themselves. A result that, one could argue, should be the standard
today.
